RCMP say Cortes Island artist murdered
R CMP on Vancouver Island confirm a 60-year-old B.C. artist was murdered in a rural community off the east coast of the island. Investigators say an autopsy was conducted Tuesday on the body of Stefano Savioli.
COPYCAT ISSUE : toxic fraud human waste
CAPITAL TRUST toxic waste" (risky tranches) from the mortgage derivatives
In 1994, John Meriwether, the famed Salomon Brothers bond trader, founded a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management. Meriwether assembled an all-star team of traders and academics in an attempt to create a fund that would profit from the combination of the academics' quantitative models and the traders' market judgement and execution capabilities. Sophisticated investors, including many large investment banks, flocked to the fund, investing $1.3 billion at inception. But four years later, at the end of September 1998, the fund had lost substantial amounts of the investors' equity capital and was teetering on the brink of default. To avoid the threat of a systemic crisis in the world financial system, the Federal Reserve orchestrated a $3.5 billion rescue package from leading U.S. investment and commercial banks. In exchange the participants received 90% of LTCM's equity.
The lessons to be learned from this crisis are:
Market values matter for leveraged portfolios;
Liquidity itself is a risk factor;
Models must be stress-tested and combined with judgement; and
Financial institutions should aggregate exposures to common risk factors.
LTCM seemed destined for success. After all, it had John Meriwether, the famed bond trader from Salomon Brothers, at its helm. Also on board were Nobel-prize winning economists Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, as well as David Mullins, a former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board who had quit his job to become a partner at LTCM. These credentials convinced 80 founding investors to pony up the minimum investment of $10 million apiece, including Bear Sterns President James Cayne and his deputy. Merrill Lynch purchased a significant share to sell to its wealthy clients, including a number of its executives and its own CEO, David Komansky. A similar strategy was employed by the Union Bank of Switzerland (The Washington Post, 9/27/98).
LTCM's main strategy was to make convergence trades. These trades involved finding securities that were mispriced relative to one another, taking long positions in the cheap ones and short positions in the rich ones. There were four main types of trade:
Convergence among U.S., Japan, and European sovereign bonds;
Convergence among European sovereign bonds;
Convergence between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. government bonds;
Long positions in emerging markets sovereigns, hedged back to dollars.
Because these differences in values were tiny, the fund needed to take large and highly-leveraged positions in order to make a significant profit. At the beginning of 1998, the fund had equity of $5 billion and had borrowed over $125 billion — a leverage factor of roughly thirty to one. LTCM's partners believed, on the basis of their complex computer models, that the long and short positions were highly correlated and so the net risk was small.
1994: Long-Term Capital Management is founded by John Meriwether and accepts investments from 80 investors who put up a minimum of $10 million each. The initial equity capitalisation of the firm is $1.3 billion. (The Washington Post, 27 September 1998)
End of 1997: After two years of returns running close to 40%, the fund has some $7 billion under management and is achieving only a 27% return — comparable with the return on US equities that year.
Meriwether returns about $2.7 billion of the fund's capital back to investors because "investment opportunities were not large and attractive enough" (The Washington Post, 27 September 1998).
Early 1998: The portfolio under LTCM's control amounts to well over $100 billion, while net asset value stands at some $4 billion; its swaps position is valued at some $1.25 trillion notional, equal to 5% of the entire global market. It had become a major supplier of index volatility to investment banks, was active in mortgage-backed securities and was dabbling in emerging markets such as Russia (Risk, October 1998)
17 August 1998: Russia devalues the rouble and declares a moratorium on 281 billion roubles ($13.5 billion) of its Treasury debt. The result is a massive "flight to quality", with investors flooding out of any remotely risky market and into the most secure instruments within the already "risk-free" government bond market. Ultimately, this results in a liquidity crisis of enormous proportions, dealing a severe blow to LTCM's portfolio.
1 September 1998: LTCM's equity has dropped to $2.3 billion. John Meriwether circulates a letter which discloses the massive loss and offers the chance to invest in the fund "on special terms". Existing investors are told that they will not be allowed to withdraw more than 12% of their investment, and not until December.
22 September 1998: LTCM's equity has dropped to $600 million. The portfolio has not shrunk significantly, and so its leverage is even higher. Banks begin to doubt the fund's ability to meet its margin calls but cannot move to liquidate for fear that it will precipitate a crisis that will cause huge losses among the fund's counterparties and potentially lead to a systemic crisis.
23 September 98: Goldman Sachs, AIG and Warren Buffett offer to buy out LTCM's partners for $250 million, to inject $4 billion into the ailing fund and run it as part of Goldman's proprietary trading operation. The offer is not accepted. That afternoon, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting to prevent a potential systemic meltdown, organises a rescue package under which a consortium of leading investment and commercial banks, including LTCM's major creditors, inject $3.5-billion into the fund and take over its management, in exchange for 90% of LTCM's equity.
Fourth quarter 1998: The damage from LTCM's near-demise was widespread. Many banks take a substantial write-off as a result of losses on their investments. UBS takes a third-quarter charge of $700 million, Dresdner Bank AG a $145 million charge, and Credit Suisse $55 million. Additionally, UBS chairman Mathis Cabiallavetta and three top executives resign in the wake of the bank's losses (The Wall Street Journal Europe, 5 October 1998). Merrill Lynch's global head of risk and credit management likewise leaves the firm.
April 1999: President Clinton publishes a study of the LTCM crisis and its implications for systemic risk in financial markets, entitled the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (Governance and Risk Control-Regulatory guidelines-president's working group)
In 1994, John Meriwether, the famed Salomon Brothers bond trader, founded a hedge fund called Long-Term Capital Management. Meriwether assembled an all-star team of traders and academics in an attempt to create a fund that would profit from the combination of the academics' quantitative models and the traders' market judgement and execution capabilities. Sophisticated investors, including many large investment banks, flocked to the fund, investing $1.3 billion at inception. But four years later, at the end of September 1998, the fund had lost substantial amounts of the investors' equity capital and was teetering on the brink of default. To avoid the threat of a systemic crisis in the world financial system, the Federal Reserve orchestrated a $3.5 billion rescue package from leading U.S. investment and commercial banks. In exchange the participants received 90% of LTCM's equity.
The lessons to be learned from this crisis are:
Market values matter for leveraged portfolios;
Liquidity itself is a risk factor;
Models must be stress-tested and combined with judgement; and
Financial institutions should aggregate exposures to common risk factors.
LTCM seemed destined for success. After all, it had John Meriwether, the famed bond trader from Salomon Brothers, at its helm. Also on board were Nobel-prize winning economists Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, as well as David Mullins, a former vice-chairman of the Federal Reserve Board who had quit his job to become a partner at LTCM. These credentials convinced 80 founding investors to pony up the minimum investment of $10 million apiece, including Bear Sterns President James Cayne and his deputy. Merrill Lynch purchased a significant share to sell to its wealthy clients, including a number of its executives and its own CEO, David Komansky. A similar strategy was employed by the Union Bank of Switzerland (The Washington Post, 9/27/98).
LTCM's main strategy was to make convergence trades. These trades involved finding securities that were mispriced relative to one another, taking long positions in the cheap ones and short positions in the rich ones. There were four main types of trade:
Convergence among U.S., Japan, and European sovereign bonds;
Convergence among European sovereign bonds;
Convergence between on-the-run and off-the-run U.S. government bonds;
Long positions in emerging markets sovereigns, hedged back to dollars.
Because these differences in values were tiny, the fund needed to take large and highly-leveraged positions in order to make a significant profit. At the beginning of 1998, the fund had equity of $5 billion and had borrowed over $125 billion — a leverage factor of roughly thirty to one. LTCM's partners believed, on the basis of their complex computer models, that the long and short positions were highly correlated and so the net risk was small.
1994: Long-Term Capital Management is founded by John Meriwether and accepts investments from 80 investors who put up a minimum of $10 million each. The initial equity capitalisation of the firm is $1.3 billion. (The Washington Post, 27 September 1998)
End of 1997: After two years of returns running close to 40%, the fund has some $7 billion under management and is achieving only a 27% return — comparable with the return on US equities that year.
Meriwether returns about $2.7 billion of the fund's capital back to investors because "investment opportunities were not large and attractive enough" (The Washington Post, 27 September 1998).
Early 1998: The portfolio under LTCM's control amounts to well over $100 billion, while net asset value stands at some $4 billion; its swaps position is valued at some $1.25 trillion notional, equal to 5% of the entire global market. It had become a major supplier of index volatility to investment banks, was active in mortgage-backed securities and was dabbling in emerging markets such as Russia (Risk, October 1998)
17 August 1998: Russia devalues the rouble and declares a moratorium on 281 billion roubles ($13.5 billion) of its Treasury debt. The result is a massive "flight to quality", with investors flooding out of any remotely risky market and into the most secure instruments within the already "risk-free" government bond market. Ultimately, this results in a liquidity crisis of enormous proportions, dealing a severe blow to LTCM's portfolio.
1 September 1998: LTCM's equity has dropped to $2.3 billion. John Meriwether circulates a letter which discloses the massive loss and offers the chance to invest in the fund "on special terms". Existing investors are told that they will not be allowed to withdraw more than 12% of their investment, and not until December.
22 September 1998: LTCM's equity has dropped to $600 million. The portfolio has not shrunk significantly, and so its leverage is even higher. Banks begin to doubt the fund's ability to meet its margin calls but cannot move to liquidate for fear that it will precipitate a crisis that will cause huge losses among the fund's counterparties and potentially lead to a systemic crisis.
23 September 98: Goldman Sachs, AIG and Warren Buffett offer to buy out LTCM's partners for $250 million, to inject $4 billion into the ailing fund and run it as part of Goldman's proprietary trading operation. The offer is not accepted. That afternoon, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, acting to prevent a potential systemic meltdown, organises a rescue package under which a consortium of leading investment and commercial banks, including LTCM's major creditors, inject $3.5-billion into the fund and take over its management, in exchange for 90% of LTCM's equity.
Fourth quarter 1998: The damage from LTCM's near-demise was widespread. Many banks take a substantial write-off as a result of losses on their investments. UBS takes a third-quarter charge of $700 million, Dresdner Bank AG a $145 million charge, and Credit Suisse $55 million. Additionally, UBS chairman Mathis Cabiallavetta and three top executives resign in the wake of the bank's losses (The Wall Street Journal Europe, 5 October 1998). Merrill Lynch's global head of risk and credit management likewise leaves the firm.
April 1999: President Clinton publishes a study of the LTCM crisis and its implications for systemic risk in financial markets, entitled the President's Working Group on Financial Markets (Governance and Risk Control-Regulatory guidelines-president's working group)
Commissioner Wally Oppal has been asked to examine why the police failed to catch Pickton as he murdered sex workers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and why prosecutors declined to pursue attempted murder charges against Pickton after an attack on a prostitute in 1997.
Why has one of deputy chief LePard DETECTIVE NOT FOLLOWED UP ON
# VANCOUVER POLICE FILE?
AKA DEADMAN PEDOPHILE AT CLACIER
AKA -INSURANCE FRAUDS/MORTGAGE FRAUD
Unable to catch a serial killer by The Canadian Press - Story: 66963
Nov 6, 2011 / 9:44 am
Why ? because JUDGING BY THE JERVIS DEADMAN'S JOURNAL A CIA MK ULTRA BACKED SUB-OPERATION WHICH AS BEEN RUNNING ON THE BC SUNCHINE COAST FOR DECADES -DEAD PEASANTS INSURANCE LIFE SETTLEMENTS CASH FLOW
WELFARE AGENCIES HAD ALL INFORMATION TO SET UP TARGETED DRUG ADDICTED VICTIMS
The two police agencies that failed to stop Robert Pickton as he hunted sex workers in Vancouver's Downtown Eastside are about to appear at the public inquiry into the case to explain why they were unable to catch a serial killer.
LePard accused the RCMPof letting the investigation sit idle for months and then botching an interrogation with Pickton in 2000.
LePard will take the inquiry through his 450-page report, which was released publicly last year and detailed a series of errors made by the Vancouvr police and the RCMP.
LePard blamed ineffective information sharing, poor leadership and a lack of resources. He said several officers who came forward with information were ignored, particularly Kim Rossmo, a geographic profiler with the Vancouver police who warned a serial killer could be at work.
The report saved its worst criticism for the RCMP, which LePard accused of letting the investigation sit idle for months and then botching an interrogation with Pickton in 2000.
.C.
The inquiry has spent weeks hearing expert evidence about the Downtown Eastside and the city's sex trade, as well as testimony from the victims' families. But its main purpose is to examine what went wrong with the police investigations.
That work is set to begin Monday, as Vancouver's Deputy Chief Doug LePard, who authored an internal report about the Pickton investigation, becomes the first police witness. After him, the author of a similar RCMP report will testify, as will a senior officer from the Peel Regional Police in Ontario who was asked to provide an outside opinion.
The testimony will mark a significant turning point at the inquiry, which will now spend the next several months hearing from police officers.
"We've set the stage and provided the backgrounds, and now we'll do the main work, which is the police investigation," Art Vertlieb, the commission's lead lawyer, said in an interview.
Once the authors of those three reports testify, the inquiry will then hear from officers who were actually involved with the investigations, said Vertlieb.
Commissioner Wally Oppal has been asked to examine why the police failed to catch Pickton as he murdered sex workers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and why prosecutors declined to pursue attempted murder charges against Pickton after an attack on a prostitute in 1997.
Oppal's job will be to sort through the testimony of investigators and the inevitable finger-pointing between the Vancouver police and the RCMP to determine precisely what happened, and then make recommendations for the future.
Pickton was arrested in 2002 and eventually convicted of six murders, though the remains or DNA of 33 women were found on his farm. Pickton claimed he killed 49.
Vancouver police were investigating reports of missing women in the Downtown Eastside, while the RCMP in nearby Port Coquitlam, where the Pickton farm was located, started looking at Pickton after the attempted murder allegations in 1997. The two forces later formed a joint investigation.
The Vancouver police has already admitted its investigation was a failure and apologized to the families of Pickton's victims. The RCMP has done neither.
Both forces have argued that, regardless of any failings the inquiry identifies, their officers did the best they could with the information they had at the time.
LePard will take the inquiry through his 450-page report, which was released publicly last year and detailed a series of errors made by the Vancouver police and the RCMP.
LePard blamed ineffective information sharing, poor leadership and a lack of resources. He said several officers who came forward with information were ignored, particularly Kim Rossmo, a geographic profiler with the Vancouver police who warned a serial killer could be at work.
The report saved its worst criticism for the RCMP, which LePard accused of letting the investigation sit idle for months and then botching an interrogation with Pickton in 2000.
The RCMP's internal report, which was kept hidden until it was submitted as an exhibit at the inquiry last month, is much less critical.
Prepared in 2002 in response to a civil lawsuit, the report admits there were difficulties in corroborating allegations that Pickton was involved in killing sex workers, but nevertheless suggested the force did all it could.
The report also insists the RCMP was able to work well with the Vancouver police, and it complained that scarce resources were spread across a number of high-profile investigations, making it difficult to pursue Pickton with more vigour.
The Peel Regional Police report hasn't yet been submitted to the inquiry.
Jason Gratl, an independent lawyer appointed to represent the interests of the Downtown Eastside, said the reports from the Vancouver police and the RCMP are useful, but he said the inquiry must be careful to treat them with an appropriate level of skepticism.
"We don't want to see the LePard report serve as a substitute for the commissioner's role in making findings of fact, but the LePard report and his testimony is likely to be useful to provide a broad overview of what happened in terms of the investigations," said Gratl.
"From our point of view, it's difficult to judge prior to cross-examination the extent that these reports were intended to serve institutional interest."
Cameron Ward, who is representing the families of 18 missing women, said he's more interested in hearing from the police officers themselves, rather than the authors of internal reports.
"What my clients are really interested in probing is what the investigators themselves did or didn't do, what they knew and when they knew it, and why it took them almost five years to stop Mr. Pickton," said Ward
"Those are the key factual questions, and I don't think we're going to get answers to those until the actual investigators show up,."
The inquiry will take a break at the end of the month and resume in the new year.
Oppal hopes to finish hearings by the end of April in order to finish his final report by his deadline of June 30.
The inquiry has spent weeks hearing expert evidence about the Downtown Eastside and the city's sex trade, as well as testimony from the victims' families. But its main purpose is to examine what went wrong with the police investigations.
That work is set to begin Monday, as Vancouver's Deputy Chief Doug LePard, who authored an internal report about the Pickton investigation, becomes the first police witness. After him, the author of a similar RCMP report will testify, as will a senior officer from the Peel Regional Police in Ontario who was asked to provide an outside opinion.
The testimony will mark a significant turning point at the inquiry, which will now spend the next several months hearing from police officers.
"We've set the stage and provided the backgrounds, and now we'll do the main work, which is the police investigation," Art Vertlieb, the commission's lead lawyer, said in an interview.
Once the authors of those three reports testify, the inquiry will then hear from officers who were actually involved with the investigations, said Vertlieb.
Commissioner Wally Oppal has been asked to examine why the police failed to catch Pickton as he murdered sex workers in the late 1990s and early 2000s, and why prosecutors declined to pursue attempted murder charges against Pickton after an attack on a prostitute in 1997.
Oppal's job will be to sort through the testimony of investigators and the inevitable finger-pointing between the Vancouver police and the RCMP to determine precisely what happened, and then make recommendations for the future.
Pickton was arrested in 2002 and eventually convicted of six murders, though the remains or DNA of 33 women were found on his farm. Pickton claimed he killed 49.
Vancouver police were investigating reports of missing women in the Downtown Eastside, while the RCMP in nearby Port Coquitlam, where the Pickton farm was located, started looking at Pickton after the attempted murder allegations in 1997. The two forces later formed a joint investigation.
The Vancouver police has already admitted its investigation was a failure and apologized to the families of Pickton's victims. The RCMP has done neither.
Both forces have argued that, regardless of any failings the inquiry identifies, their officers did the best they could with the information they had at the time.
LePard will take the inquiry through his 450-page report, which was released publicly last year and detailed a series of errors made by the Vancouver police and the RCMP.
LePard blamed ineffective information sharing, poor leadership and a lack of resources. He said several officers who came forward with information were ignored, particularly Kim Rossmo, a geographic profiler with the Vancouver police who warned a serial killer could be at work.
The report saved its worst criticism for the RCMP, which LePard accused of letting the investigation sit idle for months and then botching an interrogation with Pickton in 2000.
The RCMP's internal report, which was kept hidden until it was submitted as an exhibit at the inquiry last month, is much less critical.
Prepared in 2002 in response to a civil lawsuit, the report admits there were difficulties in corroborating allegations that Pickton was involved in killing sex workers, but nevertheless suggested the force did all it could.
The report also insists the RCMP was able to work well with the Vancouver police, and it complained that scarce resources were spread across a number of high-profile investigations, making it difficult to pursue Pickton with more vigour.
The Peel Regional Police report hasn't yet been submitted to the inquiry.
Jason Gratl, an independent lawyer appointed to represent the interests of the Downtown Eastside, said the reports from the Vancouver police and the RCMP are useful, but he said the inquiry must be careful to treat them with an appropriate level of skepticism.
"We don't want to see the LePard report serve as a substitute for the commissioner's role in making findings of fact, but the LePard report and his testimony is likely to be useful to provide a broad overview of what happened in terms of the investigations," said Gratl.
"From our point of view, it's difficult to judge prior to cross-examination the extent that these reports were intended to serve institutional interest."
Cameron Ward, who is representing the families of 18 missing women, said he's more interested in hearing from the police officers themselves, rather than the authors of internal reports.
"What my clients are really interested in probing is what the investigators themselves did or didn't do, what they knew and when they knew it, and why it took them almost five years to stop Mr. Pickton," said Ward
"Those are the key factual questions, and I don't think we're going to get answers to those until the actual investigators show up,."
The inquiry will take a break at the end of the month and resume in the new year.
Oppal hopes to finish hearings by the end of April in order to finish his final report by his deadline of June 30.
Aerospace Contractor Indicted in Fraud Case AP
Published: May 11, 1990
The company and the managers are charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud, to make false statements to the Government and to cheat it. The charges against the managers carry a maximum sentence of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. The company faces liability for false claims to the Government, plus a maximum fine of twice the gross gain or loss.
An aerospace company and two of its managers have been charged with fraud in the Government's industry-wide investigation into falsified test reports on essential aircraft components.
The complaint, filed Wednesday in Federal District Court, was against the VSI Corporation, the country's biggest maker of bolts and other parts for holding engines, wheels and other key aircraft parts in place.
An Assistant United States Attorney, Bruce D. Carter, said VSI had been involved in a scheme to falsify test results on the parts for 15 years.
VSI, a subsidiary of Fairchild Industries Inc., is accused of skimping on tests and inspections, sometimes even delivering substandard parts, in an effort to raise its profits.
The complaint, filed Wednesday in Federal District Court, was against the VSI Corporation, the country's biggest maker of bolts and other parts for holding engines, wheels and other key aircraft parts in place.
An Assistant United States Attorney, Bruce D. Carter, said VSI had been involved in a scheme to falsify test results on the parts for 15 years.
VSI, a subsidiary of Fairchild Industries Inc., is accused of skimping on tests and inspections, sometimes even delivering substandard parts, in an effort to raise its profits.
reopen a civil lawsuit that the Bahrani government-controlled aluminum company filed in February 2008 against Alcoa, former agent Victor Dahdaleh of Britain and William Rice, who remains an Alcoa employee.
Aluminum Bahrain, known as Alba, is a government-controlled company that bought raw material alumina from Alcoa to make aluminum.
Mark MacDougall, an attorney representing Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. did not elaborate on what he said occurred at Alcoa's North Shore Corporate Center in connection with the alleged bribery of Aluminum Bahrain representatives from 1993 to 2007.
Aluminum Bahrain, known as Alba, is a government-controlled company that bought raw material alumina from Alcoa to make aluminum.
Alcoa allegations detailed in court By Joe Napsha, PITTSBURGH TRIBUNE-REVIEW
Friday, November 4, 2011 Yahoo! FinanceQuote for AA About the writer Joe Napsha is a Pittsburgh Tribune-Review staff writer and can be reached at 724-836-5252 or via e-mail.
A probe into allegations that Alcoa Inc. and its agents paid off representatives from a Middle East company uncovered events that "happened on Isabella Street in the city," an attorney for the aluminum company's accuser told a federal judge in Pittsburgh on Thursday.
Mark MacDougall, an attorney representing Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. did not elaborate on what he said occurred at Alcoa's North Shore Corporate Center in connection with the alleged bribery of Aluminum Bahrain representatives from 1993 to 2007.
Aluminum Bahrain, known as Alba, is a government-controlled company that bought raw material alumina from Alcoa to make aluminum.
MacDougall told U.S. District Judge Donetta Ambrose that Alba could file an expanded complaint that would outline information on a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations "enterprise that occurred within the city." MacDougall declined to elaborate after the hearing.
After the hearing, Alcoa spokeswoman Lori Lecker strongly denied MacDougall's accusations about illegal activity at Alcoa's Corporate Center.
"It is because of exactly that kind of comment that we are asking for our day in court," Lecker said.
MacDougall's allegations against Alcoa came during a hearing on a request by Alcoa to reopen a civil lawsuit that the Bahrani government-controlled aluminum company filed in February 2008 against Alcoa, former agent Victor Dahdaleh of Britain and William Rice, who remains an Alcoa employee.
The lawsuti claims Alcoa and its agents cost Alba millions of dollars by bribing officials to win contracts to supply alumina.
Dahdaleh, a Canadian national who is friends with former President Bill Clinton, was arrested in Britain last month by Britain's Serious Fraud Office on the bribery allegations in connection with the case. He has maintained his innocence and was granted $16 million bail after a hearing Monday.
Ambrose said she will decide next week whether Alcoa will get that opportunity to seek a dismissal of the lawsuit.
The lawsuit has been on hold since March 2008 when the Justice Department began an investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits U.S. companies from bribery of foreign officials and companies.
Department of Justice attorney Adam Sofwat argued that the case should remain under seal for an additional six months. The agency needs more time to bring the complex global investigation to the point where prosecutors can decide whether to indict Alcoa and its co-defendants.
"The investigation is now at a sensitive stage," Sofwat said.
Ambrose said she is concerned that if Alcoa and the other defendants wait for six months for the Justice Department to wrap up its probe, they may not be able to work out any deal with the government.
"I'm not sure why I shouldn't give the government more time, if that time is limited to six months. They (Justice Department) don't get forever," Ambrose said.
Alcoa attorney Evan Chesler said the company wants to force Alba to lay out its bribery allegations so it can defend itself.
Chesler said Alba could file its expanded complaint and block from the public documents any information that might harm the Justice Department's investigation. Ambrose, however, said she did not like to conduct the court's business out of the public's view.
Government investigators have gone to the England, Australia and Bahrain, as they review bank records and interview witnesses. If the case is opened to public scrutiny, witnesses may be harassed and intimidated, Sofwat said.
The government still needs more time, in part because Alcoa withheld "a critical set" of documents from prosecutors for more than a year, Sofwat said.
"Our investigation has been delayed by Alcoa's conduct," Sofwat said.
Still, Sofwat said that Alcoa has been a "cooperating party" in the case and has been given unspecified "indulgences" in the case. But, Sofwat said that without any deal, it is conceivable that "Alcoa could find themselves in a worse position."
"Alcoa is between the rock of the lawsuit and hard place of the RICO case," Alcoa's Chesler said.
Chesler said that Alcoa has held negotiations as recently as September with Alba to settle the dispute out of court, but MacDougall said the talks were not serious or substantial.
Read more: Alcoa allegations detailed in court - Pittsburgh Tribune-Review http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_765480.html#ixzz1d6Uab3hL
Friday, November 4, 2011 Yahoo! FinanceQuote for AA About the writer Joe Napsha is a Pittsburgh Tribune-Review staff writer and can be reached at 724-836-5252 or via e-mail.
A probe into allegations that Alcoa Inc. and its agents paid off representatives from a Middle East company uncovered events that "happened on Isabella Street in the city," an attorney for the aluminum company's accuser told a federal judge in Pittsburgh on Thursday.
Mark MacDougall, an attorney representing Aluminum Bahrain B.S.C. did not elaborate on what he said occurred at Alcoa's North Shore Corporate Center in connection with the alleged bribery of Aluminum Bahrain representatives from 1993 to 2007.
Aluminum Bahrain, known as Alba, is a government-controlled company that bought raw material alumina from Alcoa to make aluminum.
MacDougall told U.S. District Judge Donetta Ambrose that Alba could file an expanded complaint that would outline information on a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations "enterprise that occurred within the city." MacDougall declined to elaborate after the hearing.
After the hearing, Alcoa spokeswoman Lori Lecker strongly denied MacDougall's accusations about illegal activity at Alcoa's Corporate Center.
"It is because of exactly that kind of comment that we are asking for our day in court," Lecker said.
MacDougall's allegations against Alcoa came during a hearing on a request by Alcoa to reopen a civil lawsuit that the Bahrani government-controlled aluminum company filed in February 2008 against Alcoa, former agent Victor Dahdaleh of Britain and William Rice, who remains an Alcoa employee.
The lawsuti claims Alcoa and its agents cost Alba millions of dollars by bribing officials to win contracts to supply alumina.
Dahdaleh, a Canadian national who is friends with former President Bill Clinton, was arrested in Britain last month by Britain's Serious Fraud Office on the bribery allegations in connection with the case. He has maintained his innocence and was granted $16 million bail after a hearing Monday.
Ambrose said she will decide next week whether Alcoa will get that opportunity to seek a dismissal of the lawsuit.
The lawsuit has been on hold since March 2008 when the Justice Department began an investigation into alleged violations of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits U.S. companies from bribery of foreign officials and companies.
Department of Justice attorney Adam Sofwat argued that the case should remain under seal for an additional six months. The agency needs more time to bring the complex global investigation to the point where prosecutors can decide whether to indict Alcoa and its co-defendants.
"The investigation is now at a sensitive stage," Sofwat said.
Ambrose said she is concerned that if Alcoa and the other defendants wait for six months for the Justice Department to wrap up its probe, they may not be able to work out any deal with the government.
"I'm not sure why I shouldn't give the government more time, if that time is limited to six months. They (Justice Department) don't get forever," Ambrose said.
Alcoa attorney Evan Chesler said the company wants to force Alba to lay out its bribery allegations so it can defend itself.
Chesler said Alba could file its expanded complaint and block from the public documents any information that might harm the Justice Department's investigation. Ambrose, however, said she did not like to conduct the court's business out of the public's view.
Government investigators have gone to the England, Australia and Bahrain, as they review bank records and interview witnesses. If the case is opened to public scrutiny, witnesses may be harassed and intimidated, Sofwat said.
The government still needs more time, in part because Alcoa withheld "a critical set" of documents from prosecutors for more than a year, Sofwat said.
"Our investigation has been delayed by Alcoa's conduct," Sofwat said.
Still, Sofwat said that Alcoa has been a "cooperating party" in the case and has been given unspecified "indulgences" in the case. But, Sofwat said that without any deal, it is conceivable that "Alcoa could find themselves in a worse position."
"Alcoa is between the rock of the lawsuit and hard place of the RICO case," Alcoa's Chesler said.
Chesler said that Alcoa has held negotiations as recently as September with Alba to settle the dispute out of court, but MacDougall said the talks were not serious or substantial.
Read more: Alcoa allegations detailed in court - Pittsburgh Tribune-Review http://www.pittsburghlive.com/x/pittsburghtrib/business/s_765480.html#ixzz1d6Uab3hL
