2010-When THE FICTIOUS KATHLEEN ALVES(AKA EX-WIFE SIGNATURE) DEFAULTS on the loan,which is a given ,ATB FINANCIAL (CROWN CORPORATION) CAN USE THE SEPERATION AGREEMENT & ALTERED court orders and Divorce decree allowing them the LEGAL RIGHT to charge HUSBAND/VICTIM BY WAY OF A skip transfer WHICH BECOMES Brian Lloyd Wiley"s HEIRS OF HIS estate'S TAX ARREARS PROBLEM,
ATB FINANCIAL (Crown) can recover their loss from the Taxpayers as well as title insurance. This is a win win for the all levels of the GOVERMENT of Canada and & ex wife
American mortgage industry. avalanche of foreclosures up 81 percent from 2007
US AGENTS OF IMPERIALCROWN SOVERIEGN FREEMASON INFLUENCES
AWARDING DAMAGES SEPT 11 2007
AGAINST EARL H PACE IRREVOCABLE TRUST TRUSTEE WILLIAM E PACE JOINTLY AND INDIVIDUALLY
JUDGEMENT IN FAVOUR OF GEORGE E. MILLS JR SHUTTS/BOWEN LLP
2008 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW SEMINAR MATERIALS 2008 Chapter 11 Open Forum: Year In Review By Hon. Leif M. Clark * In re Pace Trustee of Earl H. Pace Irrevocable Trust, 376 B.R 334 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Sept. 2007) (Jennemann, J.)
No more shenanigans! The court dismissed the case, but not before sanctioning the petitioner for a fraudulent filing. The trustee of an irrevocable trust filed a voluntary chapter 11 petition on behalf of the trust and listed the trust as a "business trust" on the petition.15
On motions of several creditors, the court converted the case to a chapter 7, finding the petition to have been filed in bad faith.
After the conversion and appointment of a chapter 7 trustee, the petitioner sought to dismiss the case, this time asserting that he made a mistake when he listed the debtor as a "business trust" on the petition and arguing that the debtor trust was, in fact, not eligible to be a debtor under section 109.
In response, the chapter 7 trustee argued that judicial estoppel precluded the petitioner from seeking dismissal on eligibility grounds and asked the court to retain jurisdiction over the case.
The court allowed the parties to conduct discovery to determine the nature of the debtor trust and held a hearing on the motion to dismiss.
The parties did not dispute that the debtor trust, in fact, was not a "business trust" and so was not eligible to be a debtor.
However, the court agreed that the circumstances of this case supported the application of judicial estoppel because the filing of the chapter 11 petition was nothing more than an abuse of the bankruptcy process to delay creditors.
Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court granted the debtor's motion to dismiss, noting that it had limited jurisdiction over an entity not eligible to be a debtor under section 109.
But, to be sure that the petitioning trustee's bad acts did not go unpunished, the court used its inherent authority under section 105(a) to sanction the trust and the petitioning trustee (jointly and severally) by awarding reasonable attorneys' fees to the chapter 7 trustee and creditors for costs incurred during the course of the bankruptcy case.
WHO IS THIS SOVERIEGN COURT ADMINISTRATOR ? court file FO534 CAMPBELL RIVER FAMILY COURT
2002-DEC 6 ID THEFT BL WILEY THIRD PARTY COLLECTION CIBC
CANADAIN NATURAL WESTERN GAS COMPANY LTD ALBERTA TREASURY BRANCH
$405 ,510.00 $532,000.OO (AMENDING AGREEMEMT)
0
WHO IS THE " SOVERIEGN family court " SOVEREIGN COURT ADMINISTRATOR ?
Accordingly, Petitioner's § 2255 motion (CV Doc. No. 1; CR Doc. No. 552) is DENIED as time-barred and as a successive filing. The Clerk is directed to enter judgment against Petitioner in the civil case and to close the civil case.
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a motion to vacate has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability ("COA"). Id. "A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these circumstances. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 5th day of June, 2009.
CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY AND LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS DENIED
IT IS FURTHERED ORDERED that Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. A prisoner seeking a motion to vacate has no absolute entitlement to appeal a district court's denial of his motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). Rather, a district court must first issue a certificate of appealability ("COA"). Id. "A [COA] may issue . . . only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at § 2253(c)(2). To make such a showing, Petitioner "must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong," Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)), or that "the issues presented were 'adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further,'" Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003) (quoting Barefoot v. Estelle, 463 U.S. 880, 893 n. 4 (1983)). Petitioner has not made the requisite showing in these circumstances. Finally, because Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability, he is not entitled to appeal in forma pauperis.
DONE AND ORDERED at Tampa, Florida, this 5th day of June, 2009.
WILLIAM E PACE TRUSTEE
TAXES PAID BY THE BANK OF MONTREAL SWORN UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY
DOUBLE FUNDING
The problem with these “modifications” (actually new loans with new “lenders”) is that the old loans remain unaffected.
The existing cloud on title to the property, the mortgage deed (or deed of trust), the note, the obligation, the purported assignments etc. is being compounded by attempts to allow impostors to foreclose on the mortgage, collect on the note, modify the loan, or approve a short sale.